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7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Thomas Boop dcd71f6466 Enforce safe directory (#762)
* set safe directory when running checkout

* Update CHANGELOG.md
2022-04-14 14:13:20 -04:00
Tingluo Huang add3486cc3 Patch to fix the dependbot alert. (#744)
* Patch to fix the dependbot alert.

* .

* .

* .
2022-04-05 13:01:33 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 5126516654 Bump minimist from 1.2.5 to 1.2.6 (#741)
Bumps [minimist](https://github.com/substack/minimist) from 1.2.5 to 1.2.6.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/substack/minimist/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/substack/minimist/compare/1.2.5...1.2.6)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: minimist
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-03-31 10:09:15 -04:00
Edward Thomson d50f8ea767 Add v3.0 release information to changelog (#740) 2022-03-25 09:52:31 -04:00
Thomas Boop 2d1c1198e7 update test workflows to checkout v3 (#709) 2022-03-01 13:02:13 -05:00
Thomas Boop a12a3943b4 update readme for v3 (#708)
* update readme for v3

* update readme with changes

* nit grammar
2022-03-01 12:46:45 -05:00
Thomas Boop 8f9e05e482 Update to node 16 (#689)
* Update to node 16

* update setup-node version

* Update check-dist.yml

update setup node version

* update dist/index.js
2022-02-28 16:17:29 -05:00
28 changed files with 4257 additions and 3925 deletions
+4 -4
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@@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set Node.js 12.x
- name: Set Node.js 16.x
uses: actions/setup-node@v1
with:
node-version: 12.x
node-version: 16.x
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ jobs:
fi
# If dist/ was different than expected, upload the expected version as an artifact
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
if: ${{ failure() && steps.diff.conclusion == 'failure' }}
with:
name: dist
+1 -1
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@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v1
+1 -1
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@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Check licenses
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- run: npm ci
- run: npm run licensed-check
+6 -44
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@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
with:
node-version: 12.x
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
node-version: 16.x
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- run: npm ci
- run: npm run build
- run: npm run format-check
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# Clone this repo
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
# Basic checkout
- name: Checkout basic
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ jobs:
options: --dns 127.0.0.1
services:
squid-proxy:
image: ubuntu/squid:latest
image: datadog/squid:latest
ports:
- 3128:3128
env:
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# Clone this repo
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
# Basic checkout using git
- name: Checkout basic
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# Clone this repo
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
# Basic checkout using git
- name: Checkout basic
@@ -205,41 +205,3 @@ jobs:
path: basic
- name: Verify basic
run: __test__/verify-basic.sh --archive
test-git-container:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: bitnami/git:latest
steps:
# Clone this repo
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
path: v3
# Basic checkout using git
- name: Checkout basic
uses: ./v3
with:
ref: test-data/v2/basic
- name: Verify basic
run: |
if [ ! -f "./basic-file.txt" ]; then
echo "Expected basic file does not exist"
exit 1
fi
# Verify .git folder
if [ ! -d "./.git" ]; then
echo "Expected ./.git folder to exist"
exit 1
fi
# Verify auth token
git config --global --add safe.directory "*"
git fetch --no-tags --depth=1 origin +refs/heads/main:refs/remotes/origin/main
# needed to make checkout post cleanup succeed
- name: Fix Checkout v3
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
path: v3
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+5 -7
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@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
# Changelog
## v2.5.0
- [Bump @actions/core to v1.10.0](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/962)
## v3.0.1
- [Fixed an issue where checkout failed to run in container jobs due to the new git setting `safe.directory`](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/762)
- [Bumped various npm package versions](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/744)
## v2.4.2
- [Add input `set-safe-directory`](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/776)
## v3.0.0
## v2.4.1
- [Set the safe directory option on git to prevent git commands failing when running in containers](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/762)
- [Update to node 16](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/689)
## v2.3.1
- [Fix default branch resolution for .wiki and when using SSH](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/284)
## v2.3.0
- [Fallback to the default branch](https://github.com/actions/checkout/pull/278)
+16 -43
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
<a href="https://github.com/actions/checkout"><img alt="GitHub Actions status" src="https://github.com/actions/checkout/workflows/test-local/badge.svg"></a>
</p>
# Checkout V2
# Checkout V3
This action checks-out your repository under `$GITHUB_WORKSPACE`, so your workflow can access it.
@@ -14,27 +14,14 @@ When Git 2.18 or higher is not in your PATH, falls back to the REST API to downl
# What's new
- Improved performance
- Fetches only a single commit by default
- Script authenticated git commands
- Auth token persisted in the local git config
- Supports SSH
- Creates a local branch
- No longer detached HEAD when checking out a branch
- Improved layout
- The input `path` is always relative to $GITHUB_WORKSPACE
- Aligns better with container actions, where $GITHUB_WORKSPACE gets mapped in
- Fallback to REST API download
- When Git 2.18 or higher is not in the PATH, the REST API will be used to download the files
- When using a job container, the container's PATH is used
Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous versions.
- Updated to the node16 runtime by default
- This requires a minimum [Actions Runner](https://github.com/actions/runner/releases/tag/v2.285.0) version of v2.285.0 to run, which is by default available in GHES 3.4 or later.
# Usage
<!-- start usage -->
```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
# Repository name with owner. For example, actions/checkout
# Default: ${{ github.repository }}
@@ -105,20 +92,6 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
#
# Default: false
submodules: ''
# Add repository path as safe.directory for Git global config by running `git
# config --global --add safe.directory <path>`
# Default: true
set-safe-directory: ''
# Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by
# `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. These workflows run with the base
# repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch cache scope, and runner
# access; fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted context commonly
# leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. Set to `true` only after reviewing the
# risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target.
# Default: false
allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: ''
```
<!-- end usage -->
@@ -137,7 +110,7 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
## Fetch all history for all tags and branches
```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
fetch-depth: 0
```
@@ -145,7 +118,7 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
## Checkout a different branch
```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
ref: my-branch
```
@@ -153,7 +126,7 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
## Checkout HEAD^
```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
fetch-depth: 2
- run: git checkout HEAD^
@@ -163,12 +136,12 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
```yaml
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
path: main
- name: Checkout tools repo
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
repository: my-org/my-tools
path: my-tools
@@ -178,10 +151,10 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
```yaml
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Checkout tools repo
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
repository: my-org/my-tools
path: my-tools
@@ -191,12 +164,12 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
```yaml
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
path: main
- name: Checkout private tools
uses: actions/checkout@v2
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
repository: my-org/my-private-tools
token: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }} # `GH_PAT` is a secret that contains your PAT
@@ -209,7 +182,7 @@ Refer [here](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/v1/README.md) for previous
## Checkout pull request HEAD commit instead of merge commit
```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
```
@@ -225,7 +198,7 @@ jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
```
## Push a commit using the built-in token
@@ -236,7 +209,7 @@ jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- run: |
date > generated.txt
git config user.name github-actions
+1 -3
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@@ -777,9 +777,7 @@ async function setup(testName: string): Promise<void> {
sshKey: sshPath ? 'some ssh private key' : '',
sshKnownHosts: '',
sshStrict: true,
workflowOrganizationId: 123456,
setSafeDirectory: true,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
workflowOrganizationId: 123456
}
}
-48
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@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
expect(settings.repositoryName).toBe('some-repo')
expect(settings.repositoryOwner).toBe('some-owner')
expect(settings.repositoryPath).toBe(gitHubWorkspace)
expect(settings.setSafeDirectory).toBe(true)
expect(settings.allowUnsafePrCheckout).toBe(false)
})
it('qualifies ref', async () => {
@@ -140,50 +138,4 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.workflowOrganizationId).toBe(123456)
})
describe('unsafe PR checkout guard', () => {
const forkPayload = {
repository: {id: 100},
pull_request: {
head: {
sha: '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890',
repo: {id: 200, full_name: 'attacker/fork'}
},
merge_commit_sha: 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
}
}
it('allows the default self-checkout on a fork pull_request_target', async () => {
const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
const originalPayload = github.context.payload
try {
github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
// Simulate a rebase/fast-forward merge where the base tip (event SHA)
// equals the PR head SHA. The default self-checkout must still succeed.
github.context.sha = '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890'
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.commit).toBe('1234567890123456789012345678901234567890')
} finally {
github.context.eventName = originalEvent
github.context.payload = originalPayload
}
})
it('refuses an explicit fork repository on pull_request_target', async () => {
const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
const originalPayload = github.context.payload
try {
github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
inputs.repository = 'attacker/fork'
await expect(inputHelper.getInputs()).rejects.toThrow(
/Refusing to check out fork pull request code/
)
} finally {
github.context.eventName = originalEvent
github.context.payload = originalPayload
}
})
})
})
-267
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@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
import * as github from '@actions/github'
import {assertSafePrCheckout} from '../lib/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper'
// Shallow clone original @actions/github context
const originalContext = {...github.context}
const originalEventName = github.context.eventName
const originalPayload = github.context.payload
const BASE_REPO_ID = 100
const FORK_REPO_ID = 200
const PR_HEAD_SHA = '1111111111111111111111111111111111111111'
const PR_MERGE_SHA = '2222222222222222222222222222222222222222'
const SAFE_BASE_SHA = '3333333333333333333333333333333333333333'
const WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA = '4444444444444444444444444444444444444444'
const BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO = 'some-owner/some-repo'
const FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO = 'another-repo/fork'
function setContext(eventName: string, payload: object): void {
;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName = eventName
;(github.context as {payload: object}).payload = payload
}
function forkPullRequestTargetPayload(): object {
return {
repository: {id: BASE_REPO_ID},
pull_request: {
head: {
sha: PR_HEAD_SHA,
repo: {id: FORK_REPO_ID, full_name: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO}
},
merge_commit_sha: PR_MERGE_SHA
}
}
}
function sameRepoPullRequestTargetPayload(): object {
return {
repository: {id: BASE_REPO_ID},
pull_request: {
head: {
sha: PR_HEAD_SHA,
repo: {id: BASE_REPO_ID, full_name: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO}
},
merge_commit_sha: PR_MERGE_SHA
}
}
}
function forkWorkflowRunPayload(): object {
return {
repository: {id: BASE_REPO_ID},
workflow_run: {
event: 'pull_request',
head_commit: {id: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA},
head_repository: {id: FORK_REPO_ID, full_name: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO}
}
}
}
describe('unsafe-pr-checkout-helper', () => {
beforeAll(() => {
jest.spyOn(github.context, 'repo', 'get').mockReturnValue({
owner: 'some-owner',
repo: 'some-repo'
})
})
afterEach(() => {
;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName = originalEventName
;(github.context as {payload: object}).payload = originalPayload
})
afterAll(() => {
;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName =
originalContext.eventName
;(github.context as {payload: object}).payload = originalContext.payload
jest.restoreAllMocks()
})
it('allows pull_request events untouched', () => {
setContext('pull_request', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: 'attacker/fork',
ref: 'refs/pull/1/merge',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).not.toThrow()
})
it('allows pull_request_target default checkout (base branch)', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: 'refs/heads/main',
commit: SAFE_BASE_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).not.toThrow()
})
it('allows same-repo pull_request_target checkout of PR head', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', sameRepoPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: PR_HEAD_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).not.toThrow()
})
it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR head SHA checkout', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: PR_HEAD_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow(/Refusing to check out fork pull request code/)
})
it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR merge_commit_sha checkout', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: PR_MERGE_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow(/allow-unsafe-pr-checkout/)
})
it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR ref pattern (head)', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: 'refs/pull/42/head',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR ref pattern (merge)', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: 'refs/pull/42/merge',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('refuses pull_request_target when repository points at the fork', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: 'refs/heads/main',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('allows pull_request_target checkout of an unrelated third-party repo', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: 'some-other/unrelated',
ref: 'refs/heads/main',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).not.toThrow()
})
it('refuses pull_request_target ignoring repository case differences', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO.toUpperCase(),
ref: '',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('refuses pull_request_target ignoring commit SHA case differences', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: PR_HEAD_SHA.toUpperCase(),
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('allows pull_request_target fork PR checkout when opted in', () => {
setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: 'refs/pull/42/merge',
commit: '',
allowUnsafePrCheckout: true
})
).not.toThrow()
})
it('refuses workflow_run fork PR head_commit.id checkout', () => {
setContext('workflow_run', forkWorkflowRunPayload())
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('refuses workflow_run with pull_request_target underlying event', () => {
const payload = forkWorkflowRunPayload() as {
workflow_run: {event: string}
}
payload.workflow_run.event = 'pull_request_target'
setContext('workflow_run', payload)
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).toThrow()
})
it('allows workflow_run same-repo PR (head_repository.id matches base)', () => {
const payload = forkWorkflowRunPayload() as {
workflow_run: {head_repository: {id: number}}
}
payload.workflow_run.head_repository.id = BASE_REPO_ID
setContext('workflow_run', payload)
expect(() =>
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO,
ref: '',
commit: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
})
).not.toThrow()
})
})
+1 -13
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@@ -68,19 +68,7 @@ inputs:
When the `ssh-key` input is not provided, SSH URLs beginning with `git@github.com:` are
converted to HTTPS.
default: false
set-safe-directory:
description: Add repository path as safe.directory for Git global config by running `git config --global --add safe.directory <path>`
default: true
allow-unsafe-pr-checkout:
description: >
Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by
`pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. These workflows run with the
base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch cache scope, and
runner access; fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted
context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. Set to `true`
only after reviewing the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target.
default: false
runs:
using: node12
using: node16
main: dist/index.js
post: dist/index.js
+573 -2804
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+3599 -494
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+5 -6
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "checkout",
"version": "2.6.0",
"version": "2.0.2",
"description": "checkout action",
"main": "lib/main.js",
"scripts": {
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/actions/checkout#readme",
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.0",
"@actions/core": "^1.2.6",
"@actions/exec": "^1.0.1",
"@actions/github": "^2.2.0",
"@actions/io": "^1.1.2",
"@actions/io": "^1.0.1",
"@actions/tool-cache": "^1.1.2",
"uuid": "^3.3.3"
},
@@ -39,12 +39,11 @@
"@types/jest": "^27.0.2",
"@types/node": "^12.7.12",
"@types/uuid": "^3.4.6",
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^5.45.0",
"@typescript-eslint/parser": "^5.45.0",
"@typescript-eslint/parser": "^5.1.0",
"@zeit/ncc": "^0.20.5",
"eslint": "^7.32.0",
"eslint-plugin-github": "^4.3.2",
"eslint-plugin-jest": "^25.7.0",
"eslint-plugin-jest": "^25.2.2",
"jest": "^27.3.0",
"jest-circus": "^27.3.0",
"js-yaml": "^3.13.1",
+20 -7
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export interface IGitAuthHelper {
configureAuth(): Promise<void>
configureGlobalAuth(): Promise<void>
configureSubmoduleAuth(): Promise<void>
configureTempGlobalConfig(): Promise<string>
configureTempGlobalConfig(repositoryPath?: string): Promise<string>
removeAuth(): Promise<void>
removeGlobalConfig(): Promise<void>
}
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ class GitAuthHelper {
await this.configureToken()
}
async configureTempGlobalConfig(): Promise<string> {
async configureTempGlobalConfig(repositoryPath?: string): Promise<string> {
// Already setup global config
if (this.temporaryHomePath?.length > 0) {
return path.join(this.temporaryHomePath, '.gitconfig')
@@ -121,6 +121,21 @@ class GitAuthHelper {
)
this.git.setEnvironmentVariable('HOME', this.temporaryHomePath)
// Setup the workspace as a safe directory, so if we pass this into a container job with a different user it doesn't fail
// Otherwise all git commands we run in a container fail
core.info(
`Adding working directory to the temporary git global config as a safe directory`
)
await this.git
.config(
'safe.directory',
repositoryPath ?? this.settings.repositoryPath,
true,
true
)
.catch(error => {
core.info(`Failed to initialize safe directory with error: ${error}`)
})
return newGitConfigPath
}
@@ -157,8 +172,7 @@ class GitAuthHelper {
// by process creation audit events, which are commonly logged. For more information,
// refer to https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
const output = await this.git.submoduleForeach(
// wrap the pipeline in quotes to make sure it's handled properly by submoduleForeach, rather than just the first part of the pipeline
`sh -c "git config --local '${this.tokenConfigKey}' '${this.tokenPlaceholderConfigValue}' && git config --local --show-origin --name-only --get-regexp remote.origin.url"`,
`git config --local '${this.tokenConfigKey}' '${this.tokenPlaceholderConfigValue}' && git config --local --show-origin --name-only --get-regexp remote.origin.url`,
this.settings.nestedSubmodules
)
@@ -247,7 +261,7 @@ class GitAuthHelper {
if (this.settings.sshKnownHosts) {
knownHosts += `# Begin from input known hosts\n${this.settings.sshKnownHosts}\n# end from input known hosts\n`
}
knownHosts += `# Begin implicitly added github.com\ngithub.com ssh-rsa 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\n# End implicitly added github.com\n`
knownHosts += `# Begin implicitly added github.com\ngithub.com ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAq2A7hRGmdnm9tUDbO9IDSwBK6TbQa+PXYPCPy6rbTrTtw7PHkccKrpp0yVhp5HdEIcKr6pLlVDBfOLX9QUsyCOV0wzfjIJNlGEYsdlLJizHhbn2mUjvSAHQqZETYP81eFzLQNnPHt4EVVUh7VfDESU84KezmD5QlWpXLmvU31/yMf+Se8xhHTvKSCZIFImWwoG6mbUoWf9nzpIoaSjB+weqqUUmpaaasXVal72J+UX2B+2RPW3RcT0eOzQgqlJL3RKrTJvdsjE3JEAvGq3lGHSZXy28G3skua2SmVi/w4yCE6gbODqnTWlg7+wC604ydGXA8VJiS5ap43JXiUFFAaQ==\n# End implicitly added github.com\n`
this.sshKnownHostsPath = path.join(runnerTemp, `${uniqueId}_known_hosts`)
stateHelper.setSshKnownHostsPath(this.sshKnownHostsPath)
await fs.promises.writeFile(this.sshKnownHostsPath, knownHosts)
@@ -366,8 +380,7 @@ class GitAuthHelper {
const pattern = regexpHelper.escape(configKey)
await this.git.submoduleForeach(
// wrap the pipeline in quotes to make sure it's handled properly by submoduleForeach, rather than just the first part of the pipeline
`sh -c "git config --local --name-only --get-regexp '${pattern}' && git config --local --unset-all '${configKey}' || :"`,
`git config --local --name-only --get-regexp '${pattern}' && git config --local --unset-all '${configKey}' || :`,
true
)
}
+2 -33
View File
@@ -40,24 +40,7 @@ export async function getSource(settings: IGitSourceSettings): Promise<void> {
try {
if (git) {
authHelper = gitAuthHelper.createAuthHelper(git, settings)
if (settings.setSafeDirectory) {
// Setup the repository path as a safe directory, so if we pass this into a container job with a different user it doesn't fail
// Otherwise all git commands we run in a container fail
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig()
core.info(
`Adding repository directory to the temporary git global config as a safe directory`
)
await git
.config('safe.directory', settings.repositoryPath, true, true)
.catch(error => {
core.info(
`Failed to initialize safe directory with error: ${error}`
)
})
stateHelper.setSafeDirectory()
}
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig()
}
// Prepare existing directory, otherwise recreate
@@ -266,21 +249,7 @@ export async function cleanup(repositoryPath: string): Promise<void> {
// Remove auth
const authHelper = gitAuthHelper.createAuthHelper(git)
try {
if (stateHelper.PostSetSafeDirectory) {
// Setup the repository path as a safe directory, so if we pass this into a container job with a different user it doesn't fail
// Otherwise all git commands we run in a container fail
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig()
core.info(
`Adding repository directory to the temporary git global config as a safe directory`
)
await git
.config('safe.directory', repositoryPath, true, true)
.catch(error => {
core.info(`Failed to initialize safe directory with error: ${error}`)
})
}
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig(repositoryPath)
await authHelper.removeAuth()
} finally {
await authHelper.removeGlobalConfig()
-11
View File
@@ -78,15 +78,4 @@ export interface IGitSourceSettings {
* Organization ID for the currently running workflow (used for auth settings)
*/
workflowOrganizationId: number | undefined
/**
* Indicates whether to add repositoryPath as safe.directory in git global config
*/
setSafeDirectory: boolean
/**
* Opt-in to allow checking out fork pull request code from a workflow
* triggered by pull_request_target or workflow_run.
*/
allowUnsafePrCheckout: boolean
}
+2 -28
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import * as core from '@actions/core'
import * as fsHelper from './fs-helper'
import * as github from '@actions/github'
import * as path from 'path'
import * as unsafePrCheckoutHelper from './unsafe-pr-checkout-helper'
import * as workflowContextHelper from './workflow-context-helper'
import {IGitSourceSettings} from './git-source-settings'
export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
const result = {} as unknown as IGitSourceSettings
const result = ({} as unknown) as IGitSourceSettings
// GitHub workspace
let githubWorkspacePath = process.env['GITHUB_WORKSPACE']
@@ -121,32 +120,7 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
(core.getInput('persist-credentials') || 'false').toUpperCase() === 'TRUE'
// Workflow organization ID
result.workflowOrganizationId =
await workflowContextHelper.getOrganizationId()
// Set safe.directory in git global config.
result.setSafeDirectory =
(core.getInput('set-safe-directory') || 'true').toUpperCase() === 'TRUE'
// Allow unsafe PR checkout (opt-in for pull_request_target / workflow_run fork PRs)
result.allowUnsafePrCheckout =
(core.getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() ===
'TRUE'
core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`)
// The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
// resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
// the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
// repository or ref.
const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref')
if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
})
}
result.workflowOrganizationId = await workflowContextHelper.getOrganizationId()
return result
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ function updateUsage(
}
updateUsage(
'actions/checkout@v2',
'actions/checkout@v3',
path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'action.yml'),
path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'README.md')
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ export async function checkCommitInfo(
}
}
export function fromPayload(path: string): any {
function fromPayload(path: string): any {
return select(github.context.payload, path)
}
+19 -21
View File
@@ -1,60 +1,58 @@
import * as core from '@actions/core'
import * as coreCommand from '@actions/core/lib/command'
/**
* Indicates whether the POST action is running
*/
export const IsPost = !!core.getState('isPost')
export const IsPost = !!process.env['STATE_isPost']
/**
* The repository path for the POST action. The value is empty during the MAIN action.
*/
export const RepositoryPath = core.getState('repositoryPath')
/**
* The set-safe-directory for the POST action. The value is set if input: 'safe-directory' is set during the MAIN action.
*/
export const PostSetSafeDirectory = core.getState('setSafeDirectory') === 'true'
export const RepositoryPath =
(process.env['STATE_repositoryPath'] as string) || ''
/**
* The SSH key path for the POST action. The value is empty during the MAIN action.
*/
export const SshKeyPath = core.getState('sshKeyPath')
export const SshKeyPath = (process.env['STATE_sshKeyPath'] as string) || ''
/**
* The SSH known hosts path for the POST action. The value is empty during the MAIN action.
*/
export const SshKnownHostsPath = core.getState('sshKnownHostsPath')
export const SshKnownHostsPath =
(process.env['STATE_sshKnownHostsPath'] as string) || ''
/**
* Save the repository path so the POST action can retrieve the value.
*/
export function setRepositoryPath(repositoryPath: string) {
core.saveState('repositoryPath', repositoryPath)
coreCommand.issueCommand(
'save-state',
{name: 'repositoryPath'},
repositoryPath
)
}
/**
* Save the SSH key path so the POST action can retrieve the value.
*/
export function setSshKeyPath(sshKeyPath: string) {
core.saveState('sshKeyPath', sshKeyPath)
coreCommand.issueCommand('save-state', {name: 'sshKeyPath'}, sshKeyPath)
}
/**
* Save the SSH known hosts path so the POST action can retrieve the value.
*/
export function setSshKnownHostsPath(sshKnownHostsPath: string) {
core.saveState('sshKnownHostsPath', sshKnownHostsPath)
}
/**
* Save the sef-safe-directory input so the POST action can retrieve the value.
*/
export function setSafeDirectory() {
core.saveState('setSafeDirectory', 'true')
coreCommand.issueCommand(
'save-state',
{name: 'sshKnownHostsPath'},
sshKnownHostsPath
)
}
// Publish a variable so that when the POST action runs, it can determine it should run the cleanup logic.
// This is necessary since we don't have a separate entry point.
if (!IsPost) {
core.saveState('isPost', 'true')
coreCommand.issueCommand('save-state', {name: 'isPost'}, 'true')
}
-88
View File
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
import * as github from '@actions/github'
import {fromPayload} from './ref-helper'
const PR_REF_PATTERN = /^refs\/pull\/[0-9]+\/(?:head|merge)$/
export interface IUnsafePrCheckoutInput {
qualifiedRepository: string
ref: string
commit: string | undefined
allowUnsafePrCheckout: boolean
}
export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void {
if (input.allowUnsafePrCheckout) {
return
}
const eventName = github.context.eventName
if (eventName !== 'pull_request_target' && eventName !== 'workflow_run') {
return
}
const baseRepoId = fromPayload('repository.id')
if (typeof baseRepoId !== 'number') {
return
}
let prHeadRepoId: unknown
let prHeadRepoFullName: unknown
const prShas: string[] = []
if (eventName === 'pull_request_target') {
prHeadRepoId = fromPayload('pull_request.head.repo.id')
prHeadRepoFullName = fromPayload('pull_request.head.repo.full_name')
pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('pull_request.head.sha'))
pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('pull_request.merge_commit_sha'))
} else {
const wrEvent = fromPayload('workflow_run.event')
if (typeof wrEvent !== 'string' || !wrEvent.startsWith('pull_request')) {
return
}
prHeadRepoId = fromPayload('workflow_run.head_repository.id')
prHeadRepoFullName = fromPayload('workflow_run.head_repository.full_name')
pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('workflow_run.head_commit.id'))
// For `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow_run, `head_sha` is the base
// default branch SHA (not the PR head)
if (wrEvent !== 'pull_request_target') {
pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('workflow_run.head_sha'))
}
}
// (A) Fork PR?
if (typeof prHeadRepoId !== 'number' || prHeadRepoId === baseRepoId) {
return
}
// (B) We cannot check for all fork PR refs so check to see
// if the resolved input points to the fork PR sha we have in the payload
const repositoryMatchesPrHead =
typeof prHeadRepoFullName === 'string' &&
input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() === prHeadRepoFullName.toLowerCase()
const refMatchesPullPattern = PR_REF_PATTERN.test(input.ref)
const commitMatchesPrHeadSha =
!!input.commit && prShas.includes(input.commit.toLowerCase())
if (
!repositoryMatchesPrHead &&
!refMatchesPullPattern &&
!commitMatchesPrHeadSha
) {
return
}
throw new Error(
`Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` +
`This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` +
`cache scope, and runner access. Fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted ` +
`context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in, review the risks ` +
`at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target and set 'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' ` +
`on the actions/checkout step.`
)
}
function pushIfSha(target: string[], value: unknown): void {
if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) {
target.push(value.toLowerCase())
}
}